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JUDGMENT NON OBSTANTIBUS OATIS 
Reid Hastie* 
JURY TRIALS. By John Baldwin and Michael McConville. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press. 1979. Pp. vii, 150. $12.95. 
Jury Trials is a flawed book that reveals many of the obstacles 
confronting social scientists who attempt to resolve legal issues 
through empirical research. The goal of the research reported by 
Baldwin and McConville is "to evaluate the performance of the jury 
in a series of criminal trials" (p. 21). More specifically, it is "to pit, 
as it were, the verdict of the jury against the verdict of others in-
volved in the case" (p. 21). Within this comparative framework, 
three empirical questions were posed: (1) What are the evidentiary 
or case circumstances in which other participants in the trial are 
likely to express high rates of disagreement with jury verdicts? (2) 
To what extent can questionable verdicts (verdicts questioned by 
other trial participants) be explained with reference to the composi-
tion of the jury? (3) Are professional criminals more likely than 
others to avoid conviction, and are they frequently acquitted in ques-
tionable jury verdicts? 
I 
The method Baldwin and Mcconville selected to answer their 
questions was straightforward. Evaluations of jury verdicts in ap-
proximately 700 criminal trials (370 in Birmingham and 358 in 
London) were obtained from trial judges, solicitors, defendants, and 
police officers who were involved in the cases. The respondents were 
not all equally eager to participate in the research, and response rates 
and interview formats varied considerably across groups of respon-
dents. For example, the London sample included only police of-
ficers, while in Birmingham a small percentage of defendants and 
defense solicitors responded (barristers refused to participate at all); 
police and defendant data were obt~ined in face-to-face interviews, 
while solicitors and judges responded only on written questionnaires. 
Because of constraints placed on the research by legal authorities, 
Baldwin and McConville could not ask direct questions about the 
* Associate Professor of Psychology, Northwestern University. B.A. 1968, Stanford Uni-
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respondents' evaluation of the verdict. Instead, the researchers dis-
tributed a written questionnaire that included a checklist of factors 
that might explain the jury verdict, and asked the respondent to indi-
cate which factor or factors explained the verdict in a particular trial. 
For example, the possible explanatory factors for a guilty verdict in-
cluded: strength of the prosecution case, weakness of the defense 
case, absence of defense witnesses, failure of the defense to call wit-
nesses, unreliability of defense witnesses, and bad impression created 
by the defendant (p. 28). A final item asked the respondent to com-
ment on the case. The report does not describe the face-to-face in-
terview schedule, but it is clear that interview questions were more 
direct. In addition to the basic verdict evaluation data, the research-
ers collected information about jury composition ( each juror's age, 
sex, occupation, race, and number of previous jury cases), case out-
comes, case preparation, and preverdict predictions from some solic-
itors. However, the book provides detailed summaries of only the 
verdict evaluation and jury composition data. 
It is obvious that this method sharply limits conclusions from the 
research. The most important limits are created by the biased sam-
pling plan, varying response rates, and differences in the amount and 
types of information obtained from the subgroups in the sample. 
For example, we would expect that police views would dominate the 
results, that the defense point of view would be underrepresented, 
and so forth. In addition, the written questionnaire can provide 
weak support, at best, for inferences about the quality of jury ver-
dicts. The authors themselves were discomfited by the indirectness 
of their questions; we might magnify their discomfort by noting that 
laboratory research has shown that individuals' reports of their 
causal inference processes appear to be of uncertain validity. 1 If it 
seems that seif-reports are invalid, what are we to make of a solici-
tor, judge, or police officer's insights into a juror's reasoning 
processes? 
A further concern is raised by the authors' use of the question-
naire responses (mostly in the form of checkmarks) to classify jury 
verdicts as questionable or dubious. The questionnaires were not 
designed to identify improper verdicts and the authors do not de-
scribe the classification rules that they applied to infer them. Be-
cause of this omission, we never learn how the major distinction in 
the analysis (the proper versus the improper verdict) was defined. 
I. See, e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports On 
Mental Processes, 84 PSYCH. Rev. 231, 242 (1977). 
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The researchers' analysis began with the identification of "ques-
tionable" or "doubtful" verdicts followed by a search for factors to 
explain these "miscarriages of justice." In the Birmingham sample, 
"questionable acquittals" were marked whenever the trial judge and 
at least one other respondent indicated that an acquittal was not jus-
tified (pp. 46-47). Forty-one of the acquittals (thirty-six percent) 
were labeled questionable under this procedure. A verdict was clas-
sified as a "doubtful conviction" when at least two respondents (not 
necessarily including the judge) doubted the jury's verdict. Fifteen 
of the convictions (six percent) were so classified. The researchers do 
not explain how they determined that a respondent believed the ver-
dict was incorrect, and the answer is not obvious given the indirect 
nature of the questioning. Interestingly, if the authors had applied 
the same standards for convictions as for acquittals, a maximum of 
eight convictions would have been classified doubtful (p. 71). The 
method used to identify questionable acquittals (twenty-five percent, 
thirty-nine verdicts) and doubtful convictions (six percent, ten ver-
dicts) in the London sample, where police officers were the only re-
spondents, is even more obscure. 
The authors' major conclusion from the verdict disagreement re-
sults is that ''juries in both Birmingham and London were thought 
by respondents to have reached wrong or questionable conclusions 
on the evidence with a surprising frequency" (p. 127). The authors' 
efforts to account for the appearance of "questionable acquittals" 
were fruitless: 
[We] could not, for example, explain the questionable outcomes in 
terms of the social composition of the jury; we could see little evidence 
of jury equity or of juries disliking particular laws; it did not seem that 
professional criminals were often able to secure wrongful acquittals. 
In short, almost no overall patterns were evident and no common fac-
tor or factors appeared to explain the questionable outcomes we en-
countered. [P. 131.] 
As to doubtful convictions, the authors felt that their statistic in-
dicating that "at least five percent of those convicted by jury were 
said to have been convicted in doubtful circumstances" was the 
"most disturbing finding to emerge from [the] research" (p. 128). 
They concluded that two factors accounted for the occurrence of 
"doubtful convictions": 
[F]irst, that the jury appeared in many of these cases to be too easily 
satisfied of the defendants' guilt because they failed to appreciate the 
high standard of proof required in criminal cases; second, that the jury 
apparently convicted the defendant through lack of comprehension of 
the issues involved. [P. 76.] 
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The support for this two-factor explanation is summarized as a series 
of remarks made by the (nonjuror) respondents, and it is weak. It is 
not clear how well the selection of remarks represents all respon-
dents' views; many of the remarks cited do not strongly implicate the 
authors' favored factors, and, at best, the remarks are speculations 
generated by officials who were not involved in the jury's delibera-
tions. For example, Baldwin and Mcconville quote a police officer's 
remark that "I wouldn't have been surprised if they had acquitted 
him. His story was more than plausible and he was very good in 
evidence. Our case was quite weak and I was surprised at the ver-
dict. I have been generally satisfied with the jury, but not on this 
occasion" (p. 78). Three questions immediately come to mind: Does 
this quotation accurately represent all this officer's reactions to this 
verdict? Does it indicate that the officer felt that the jury "failed to 
appreciate the high standard of proof required in criminal cases," or 
might it mean that he believed some other factor explained the 
"doubtful conviction?" How would a police officer have an accurate, 
complete view of the trial evidence or of the jury's decision 
processes? These same questions can be raised for all of the anec-
dotes cited in support of the two-factor explanation, and the authors 
do not answer them. 
The authors cite a third factor, racial prejudice, that might have 
influenced jury deliberations. The defendant was black in seventeen 
percent of the questionable acquittals (seven of the forty-one) and in 
fifty-three percent of the doubtful convictions ( eight of fifteen) (p. 
81). A chi-squared test for independence of frequencies in a race 
(black-nonblack) by verdict type ( questionable acquittal-doubtful 
conviction) contingency table yields a value of 8.36, significant at the 
p<.0 I level. The authors did not calculate this statistic. They note 
that, "Given the small number of cases involved, however, even this 
pattern must be regarded as tentative in nature" (p. 131 ). 
I have noted that the authors do not clearly specify the methods 
used to identify questionable or doubtful verdicts, and they do not 
use comparable standards for classifying acquittals and convictions 
as in error. There are at least four other serious methodological 
problems with using Baldwin and McConville's data to detect rela-
tionships between questionable or doubtful verdicts and possible ex-
planatory factors. First, the search for explanatory factors focuses 
only on the improper verdict cases. The analysis is not comparative; 
features of the cases classified as questionable or improper are cited, 
but we are given no statistical or impressionistic comparison to fea-
tures of the proper-verdict cases. Thus, for example, one cannot re-
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late the statistics for improper conviction and acquittal rates of black 
defendants to the central conceptual question (What causes im-
proper verdicts?) because base-rate statistics on the fate of black de-
fendants in proper verdict cases are not supplied: an interpretation 
of the fifty-three percent doubtful conviction rate would vary consid-
erably if the base-rate for proper convictions were ten, fifty, or ninety 
percent. Second, the small sample size of fifty-six cases lowers the 
internal power of analyses within the sample and the external power 
for generalization to unsampled cases. A less obvious third problem 
is that the search for explanatory factors is not systematic. For ex-
ample, we do not know how many candidate-explanatory factors 
were considered in the analyses of potential case-dependent factors 
(chapters 4 & 5) or jury factors (chapter 6). Thus, when an apparent 
correlation between race and type of verdict error ( questionable ac-
quittal, doubtful conviction) appears, we cannot estimate its signifi-
cance because we do not know how much multiple testing has 
inflated the chances of a spurious significant result. Finally, the au-
thors could look only to five background variables Guror sex, age, 
occupation, race, and number of previous impanelments) to analyze 
the effects of jury composition on verdicts. They had no other back-
ground data, and no information concerning individual behavior 
during deliberations. Given this meager information and the meth-
odological problems described above, it is not surprising that the au-
thors failed to find relations between verdict and jury composition. 
II 
Up to this point this Review has been a catalog of methodologi-
cal weaknesses that reads like the table of contents for a research 
methods text: biased sampling plan, unequal response rates, defec-
tive questionnaire design, obscure and uneven operational classifica-
tion rules, impressionistic rather than quantitative analysis, focus on 
the positive cell to answer a correlational question, failure to report 
relevant base-rate data, inadequate sample size, unsytematic consid-
eration of multiple predictive factors, and use of aggregated data to 
answer questions about individual behavior. Although the authors 
acknowledge many of these problems, they do not accept the strong 
implications that their conclusions rest on impressions rather than 
rigorous analysis, that many subtle and distorting biases are present 
in their methods, and that their failure to discover clear empirical 
relationships was predetermined by the research plan. Instead they 
conclude: 
The evidence that we have presented in this book has shaken our own 
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confidence in the system of trial by jury. We believe that our own 
inquiry has raised a sufficient number of important questions about the 
precision of trial by jury to justify giving researchers access to the jury 
room. . . . The onus to demonstrate why this should not be done 
would now appear to lie with those who argue for its continued immu-
nity from research. [P. 132.] 
If the authors recognize that their research is riddled with many 
methodological flaws, why do they present their conclusions with 
such confidence? The answer to this question is the critical lesson to 
be learned from Jury Trials. The answer is important because the 
authors have presented strong conclusions with great significance for 
legal policy. The methodologically unsophisticated reader may be 
tempted to accept the authors' conclusion that the jury trial is a de-
fective, error-prone decision mechanism because the authors speak 
with the authority of social scientists. I want to make it clear that I 
object not to this conclusion but to the spurious use of scientific au-
thority to support the conclusion. The jury may or may not be an 
effective dispute resolution mechanism, but the authors' research re-
sults are definitely not an empirical, scientific demonstration that 
jury verdicts are error-prone. I think that such a misuse of research 
results may be the greatest sin that can be committed by a social 
scientist conducting problem-oriented research. Why does it hap-
pen? 
Several factors underlie the authors' spurious sense of confidence 
in the results of their research, and these same factors may inflate 
confidence in the results of any research. First there is the simple 
political and economic reality of the applied researcher. Social 
scientists often make their living by planning and executing research 
projects. To obtain and maintain funding they must express an air 
of confidence in their plans, their methods, and their conclusions. It 
is virtually fatal to display self-doubt, to abort a plan once funding is 
started (regardless of the limits placed on their research instruments, 
the lack of cooperation from participants, etc.), or to bury a final 
report even when it is clear the method is intolerably weak. These 
researchers have to report strong conclusions or they will be out of 
work. 
Second, pervasive and subtle biases affect the judgments of both 
na'ive and sophisticated scientists.2 Human judgments are domi-
nated by recent, salient, frequent, memorable, and emotionally 
2. See generally R. HOGARTH, JUDGMENT AND CHOICE 155 (1980); R. NISBETT & L. Ross, 
HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS ON SOCIAL JUDGMENT 249 (1980). 
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arousing sources of information. 3 Overconfidence in one's judgment 
is an almost irresistible consequence of decision making without 
feedback.4 Experience - even training in statistics and research 
methods - does not eliminate judgmental biases resulting from 
preconceptions, sampling error, and systematic measurement error.5 
The authors' overdependence on police officers' views, blindness to 
the importance of base-rate data, and overinterpretation of verbal 
comments are common examples of judgmental biases, biases that 
elude conscious detection. 
Third, the authors started the research program with an impossi-
ble question. To rephrase the logic of their investigation, they hoped 
to identify cases in which the jury verdict was in error and then to 
explain these errors with reference to characteristics of the jury. It is 
not clear that any empirical research method could adequately meet 
these goals, but the inadequacy of this method is underscored by the 
fact that jurors were not even included among the respondents. Per-
haps Baldwin and McConville's research could have provided in-
sights into factors that affect the attitudes of the judge, the solicitor, 
the defendant, and (most of all) the police officer toward a trial ver-
dict. The authors might have proposed a theory to explain the size-
able discrepancies among these perspectives; their interview data 
might have been relevant to such a theory. But, their belief that in-
terviews with these trial participants provide valid evidence concern-
ing jury behavior is simply unacceptable. 
What are the implications of these factors for the design of future 
research on jury behavior? The first strong implication is that 
policymakers and others who fund projects such as Jury Trials 
should become more sensitive to the realities of research. How to 
educate policymakers is unclear, but the consequence of ignorance is 
not: it will result in more research like that reported in Jury Trials. 
The second implication is that researchers should be aware of 
their own judgmental biases and attempt to correct for them when 
drawing conclusions from data. This is a difficult task. It is decep-
3. Taylor & Fiske, Salience, allention, and attribution: Top of the /1ead phenomena, in 11 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 253 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1978): Tversky & 
Kahneman, Availability: A heuristic for judgingfrequency and probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH, 
207, 230 (1973). 
4. See, e.g. Einhorn & Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the Illusion of Pa• 
lidit;•, 85 PSYCH. REV. 395, 409 (1978). 
5. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 Set. 1124, I 130 (1974), and Tversky & Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 
PSYCH. BULL. 105, 109 (1971). 
March 1981] Jury Trials 735 
tively easy to acknowledge the existence of a general bias but per-
versely difficult to identify its effects in one's own thought processes. 
Certainly it helps to be aware of the existence of general classes of 
bias. In addition, the relentless application of statistical procedures 
as well as the intuitive evaluation of conclusions is a strong safe-
guard. 
A third implication is that the initial step in the research program 
- statement of research questions - is of utmost importance. Two 
fine essays illustrate this point. In his essay on the "Quest for the 
Middle Range"6 Harry Kalven, Jr. clearly and forcefully argued that 
the social scientist should avoid research questions that concern 
high-level premises about fundamental values and preferences be-
cause those issues are beyond the reach of empirical facts. Similarly, 
he argued that certain premises are beneath empirical evaluation be-
cause they are trivially correct and require no additional confirma-
tion. Instead, the researcher should frame research questions in the 
middle range, where empirical results can sharpen controversy by 
eliminating some disagreements, by revealing new conceptual rela-
tions, and by focusing debate on nonempirical issues. Baldwin and 
McConville's research program that attempts to explain inaccurate 
jury verdicts by studying nonjuror reactions to the verdicts surely 
falls outside this middle range. It is probable that no adequate em-
pirical criterion for verdict accuracy could be established; it is certain 
that none was developed in Jury Trials. A second wise comment on 
research questions comes from a recent essay by Phoebe Ellsworth.7 
Ellsworth argues that one must consider not only the form of the 
question addressed by research, but also the appropriateness of the 
research method employed to answer the question. Thus, perfectly 
good questions and perfectly good methods may still result in useless 
research programs when inappropriately matched. In the present ex-
ample, I would guess that even an acceptably restated version of the 
accuracy question could not be addressed by Baldwin and McCon-
ville's indirect interview method. Post-trial interviews with jurors or 
a mock-trial would be more appropriate approaches. 
Kalven's classic essay included another message of particular rel-
evance to books like Jury Trials. Empirical researchers should not 
expect to resolve legal policy questions solely or even directly with 
6. See generally Kalven, The Quest far the Middle Range: Empirical Inquiry and Legal 
Policy, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA (G. Hazard ed. 1968). 
7. Ellsworth, From Abstract Ideas lo Concrete Instances: Some Guidelines far Choosing 
Natural Research Se/lings, 32 AM. PSYCH. 304, 309 (1977). 
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empirical facts. Legal policy disputes inevitably involve a multiplic-
ity of "legal ends"; their resolution invariably requires a consensus 
concerning preferences. Empirical truths will, only sometimes, be 
relevant. 
